Before the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine had developed key democratic institutions such as a multi-party system, regular elections, and a vibrant civil society. These democratic attributes have developed alongside defective processes such as corruption, political polarization, the influence of independent power centers, the entrenchment of categorical inequality, and the segregation of trust networks from politics. These processes have prevented the consolidation of democracy. Charles Tilly’s method of process tracing provides an analytical triad that has rarely been applied to the analysis of wartime processes affecting democracy and the long-/short-term durability of hybrid political regimes. The imposition of martial law on February 24, 2022, though vital for state defense and constitutional stability, immediately disrupted Ukraine’s normal democratic processes. This stressed Ukraine’s democracy that is still-forming, forcing a national security focus and potentially affecting democratic mechanisms. The urgency and opacity of wartime decisions may have created a space for abuse and thus undermined public confidence in democratic processes. The article examines the long-term prospects for Ukraine’s democratic development, highlighting their correlation with the geopolitical outcomes of the war.
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) have become central to NATO’s approach to future warfare, requiring the integration of military effects across Land, Sea, Air, Cyberspace, and Space. This article analyses whether the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) adequately reflects the capability requirements generated by the MDO concept. Drawing on unclassified NATO documents and open sources, the study identifies structural misalignment between domain‑centric capability planning and the integrative, data‑centric demands of MDO, and outlines implications for the adaptation of NATO defence planning.
Journal:Karo archyvas
Volume 35, Issue 1 (2020), pp. 343–373
Abstract
Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas atkurtos Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsaugos sistemos ginklų ir karo technikos įsigijimo 1990–2004 m. procesas, išskirti jo etapai, juos apibrėžiantys politiniai ir ekonominiai veiksniai, kilusios problemos, iššūkiai ir ypatumai. Tyrinėjama, kiek ir kokių ginklų būta Lietuvoje atkūrus nepriklausomybę ir kokią galimybę jais disponuoti turėjo atsikurianti Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsauga, iš kokių šaltinių ir kokiu būdu jų buvo įsigyjama.
Romania’s membership of NATO and the European Union has many advantages, but also risks for each of them. Romania continues to strengthen its position and role within NATO and the EU. Romania has shown that it is a loyal and credible partner in its relationship with all international organizations. Romania’s strategic documents with NATO and the EU are well structured and clear. These include mission, vision, strategic objectives and ways of cooperating with each other, as well as the financial, material, human and informational resources needed to implement them. The objective of our research was to identify the main threats, risks and vulnerabilities of Romania as a NATO member state. The analysis has led to the discovery of new ways of reducing risks and threats, as well as solving the major vulnerabilities of Romania. The research is based on the National Defense Strategy, the Romanian Armed Forces Endowment Plan for the period 2019-2028 and other strategic documents underpinning the development of the cooperation between Romania and NATO. Within the analysis process the main threats, risks and vulnerabilities of Romania in relation to NATO were identified. Based on the analysis carried out, several ways of action are proposed through which Romania can strengthen its defense and security capabilities. The results of the research are relevant both theoretically and practically because they show the major changes that Romania has made after entering NATO and the exceptional performances achieved both in the development of the defense and security capability and in fulfilling the commitments assumed by Romania with NATO and other organizations it belongs to.
Critical Energy Infrastructures can suffer different impacts from accidents and natural disasters which concern the whole energy system and specific functional aspects of Energy Security as well. A negative energy event -i.e. a strategic refinery blockade due to an accident- can provide useful experiences which demonstrate the connection among logistic efficiency, resilience and Energy Security. Spanish refinery Puertollano suffered an accident in year 2003 which stopped oil logistics in a significant part of the country. Military oil refined products logistics in Spain are managed by CLH oil products logistic company -operating in the framework of a Public-Private Partnership and civil-military cooperation model- and then this enterprise facilitated the implementation of a resilience measures aimed to guarantee the operation of oil products logistic chain in the affected area. Management of Puertollano refinery crisis in 2003 showed positive results for ensuring National Energy Security, market and business normal function, system stability and infrastructure re-adjustment. This crisis advanced criteria and lesson learned for Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection and business continuity planning.