Recent years have been very turbulent for the small NATO member states located near the Russian border. Concerns about the credibility of collective deterrence and overall solidarity have been growing since the start of Donald Trump’s second presidency. For the Baltic states bordering Russia, the potential withdrawal of United States military support from Europe, as well as the insufficient levels of stockpiles and defense readiness among European states, have created a significant erosion of security. Baltic needs and expectations regarding European NATO powers could be better articulated and more focused once the United States’ levels of commitment and solidarity are clarified. The primary questions, however, center on how much of the Baltic states’ future survival is in their own hands and how much depends primarily on global powers with their own ambitions and preferences in the region. New affordable and acceptable solutions need to be found quickly, collectively, and at the intra-state level. Ankara’s NATO meeting in 2026 has brought some positive energy to Baltic security and deterrence options during Trump’s second presidency. Long-expected contributions from NATO to Baltic defense and security have not only been debated but also promised.
The European defence industry faces significant challenges in light of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which has exposed critical vulnerabilities in its ability to meet the urgent demand for defence materiel and platforms. This paper examines the “defence industrial trilemma” – the delicate balance between technological excellence, economic competitiveness, and security of supply – as a key factor shaping the industry’s future. It highlights the critical role of supporting sectors – namely the steel, chemical, semiconductor, and industrial robotics industries – in maintaining Europe’s defence readiness. The analysis reveals that stringent EU regulations, soaring energy costs, and a heavy reliance on foreign suppliers hinder these industries’ growth and competitiveness. For the EU, strengthening these sectors is essential to mitigate dependencies on external supply chains and ensure Europe’s long-term defence capabilities in an increasingly volatile global landscape.
last decade. However, the significance of this issue escalated in the early 2000s following the accession of former Eastern Bloc countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which coincided with increased Alliance attention to energy security as a strategic concern. The onset of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked a period of heightened energy security uncertainty in Europe, bringing the issue to the forefront of both EU and NATO institutional discourse. This study employs securitization theory to explore the research question: How do the European Union and NATO differ in their institutional securitization of energy security during the period 2022–2024? Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis, it examines official institutional documents, statements, and strategic communications issued by both organizations. The analysis shows that energy security was framed as a security concern by both organizations throughout the period under review, although it was articulated in distinct ways that reflected each organization’s institutional context and mandate. By comparatively analyzing these discursive practices, the article contributes to the literature on securitization and international organizations by highlighting variations in how energy security is framed during periods of crisis.
The aim of the article is to analyse the perceptions of the Bucharest Nine platform regarding the most recent security developments in the region and Europe, while attempting to evaluate whether this entity can be perceived as a voice of the region or as an emerging new security community. The Bucharest Nine was established in 2015 as a response by the states located on NATO’s Eastern Flank to Russian aggression against Ukraine, with the aim of strengthening regional security through cooperation and regular meetings among representatives of different levels from the member states in order to find a common position towards European security topicalities and issues, as well as to deepen ties among the states within the region. The research suggests that after 2022, cooperation among the Bucharest Nine states intensified, as reflected by more frequent regular meetings aimed at demonstrating the region’s shared position on security issues as well as to coordinating actions taken to strengthen the region’s security ahead of major NATO events. Apart from that, the platform regularly attracted like-minded allies outside the Bucharest Nine, thus expanding its network of international states and organizations. Regularly issued joint declarations, being the main form of documentation of the platform, as well as statements by various politicians on different occasions, indicate that the Bucharest Nine states share a similar perception of security and a vision for the future development of the region. Despite some political differences and fluctuations observed within the platform recently, the region overall can be perceived as a sort of emerging security community corresponding to NATO’s Eastern Flank, reflecting regional considerations and operating within the NATO format.
This paper aims to shed light on the rationales behind China’s dual approaches to military foreign policy decision-making in major international conflicts – military aid and military intervention. Due to growing instability in the international environment, epitomised by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East, China’s stance has become increasingly significant in shaping conflict dynamics. By analysing 99 major international conflicts spanning seven decades of the regime’s governance since its inception (1949–2021), this study employs a binary multivariate logistic model to assess the determinants of China’s military foreign policies. The findings reveal that specific environmental factors drive these decisions, with their relative importance shifting as conflict conditions evolve. Moreover, the systemic evidence presented in this study not only corroborates findings from previous case studies on Chinese military policy but also tests the explanatory power of major international relations theories, offering broader insights into China’s strategic behaviour.
Before the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine had developed key democratic institutions such as a multi-party system, regular elections, and a vibrant civil society. These democratic attributes have developed alongside defective processes such as corruption, political polarization, the influence of independent power centers, the entrenchment of categorical inequality, and the segregation of trust networks from politics. These processes have prevented the consolidation of democracy. Charles Tilly’s method of process tracing provides an analytical triad that has rarely been applied to the analysis of wartime processes affecting democracy and the long-/short-term durability of hybrid political regimes. The imposition of martial law on February 24, 2022, though vital for state defense and constitutional stability, immediately disrupted Ukraine’s normal democratic processes. This stressed Ukraine’s democracy that is still-forming, forcing a national security focus and potentially affecting democratic mechanisms. The urgency and opacity of wartime decisions may have created a space for abuse and thus undermined public confidence in democratic processes. The article examines the long-term prospects for Ukraine’s democratic development, highlighting their correlation with the geopolitical outcomes of the war.