Challenges to national defence in contemporary geopolitical situation

The study focuses on an indicative analysis and critical evaluation of tools and methods used for fact-checking, which represent a key instrument in combating disinformation within the contemporary media environment. In the context of the spread of false or manipulative narratives, particularly through social media and online platforms, systematic fact-checking may be one of the tools for preserving information integrity and protecting the public from harmful content. The aim of the study is to formulate recommendations, based on a constructively critical mapping of the current situation, which can contribute to more effective management of the related agenda.

This article addresses the issue of protecting civilian space assets that are utilized by states, and particularly by armed forces. It examines the unique characteristics of operating in the space environment, importance of these space assets, the concept of the military use of space, and the strategies applied in the United States to ensure the protection of such assets. The authors propose five protective measures: war risk insurance; physical protection of the ground segment; in-orbit physical protection; deterrence; and threat information sharing.

By exploiting the potential of social media, disinformation has become an important element of warfare. The region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is particularly vulnerable to disinformation, primarily from Russia. One of the reasons for Russia’s activities in this region’s infosphere is that most CEE countries are members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, Russian disinformation activities aimed at the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) are particularly interesting. The image of the 3SI created in the media is crucial, for it translates into how the public understands, perceives and recalls this format of cooperation. The article aims to reconstruct the image of the 3SI in cases of Russian disinformation identified by the European External Action Service within the EUvsDisinfo project. The article’s methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis of disinformation cases identified by EUvsDisinfo. The article identifies four main frames of disinformation targeting the 3SI, showing that Russian disinformation is focused on undermining the credibility and integrity of this cooperation, both among Initiative countries and between them and their international partners.

Artificial intelligence is used in a variety of fields: planning operations, helping commanders make decisions, etc. However, the use of artificial intelligence in warfare faces to internationally recognized human rights, the Law of War and the Rules of Engagement. The purpose of this work is to attempt to highlight certain ethical, moral, and legal issues that may be relevant to the development and use of artificial intelligence for military purposes. Since there are not enough investigations related to such fields, this paper will be based on the analysis of the use of robots.

With the changing global security situation, increase in external threats or emergence of new ones (cyberattacks, non-conventional warfare models, etc.), countries must feel concern regarding consolidation of their security. In this regard, both the Republic of Lithuania and Ukraine are taking measures to enhance and expand their military forces. One of the means to fortify military forces is attracting citizens to serve in the civilian national defence service. Authors of the article employ a comparative aspect to analyse the need for statutory servants serving in the civilian national defence service, as well as reveal the number and type of professionals to be required by the national defence system and explore benefits provided by such statutory servants as well as their purpose in the army. Additionally, in the article authors reveal administrational-legal status of civilian national defence services in both the Republic of Lithuania and Ukraine, its place in the system of other militarised or civil public administration institutions. Comparative aspect is also used to analyse administrative legal status of statutory servants of civilian national defence service, peculiarities of admission of statutory servants to the national defence system and their service therein, as well as possibilities for motivation and stimulation of citizens to exercise service in the civilian national defence service. Therefore, the article aims to answer the question of what could motivate citizens to carry out service in the civilian national defence service, what incentives (needs, interests, values, stimulus, realisation of importance of certain matters, remuneration, etc.) would result in motivation (attitude and interest in) to serve in the Lithuanian Armed Forces and to participate in international operations.