Challenges to national defence in contemporary geopolitical situation

This study evaluates the translation capabilities of selected AI language models in a defence and security context through a multistage multilingual workflow combining translation, language identification, and back-translation. Using 32 English inputs across eight target languages, the study compares offline and online models in terms of translation quality, processing stability, and task performance across varying levels of sentence complexity. The findings indicate that all models perform strongly on basic translation tasks, but notable differences emerge in language identification, back-translation quality, and output stability. The results help clarify the conditions under which AI translation can support security-relevant multilingual workflows.

The study focuses on an indicative analysis and critical evaluation of tools and methods used for fact-checking, which represent a key instrument in combating disinformation within the contemporary media environment. In the context of the spread of false or manipulative narratives, particularly through social media and online platforms, systematic fact-checking may be one of the tools for preserving information integrity and protecting the public from harmful content. The aim of the study is to formulate recommendations, based on a constructively critical mapping of the current situation, which can contribute to more effective management of the related agenda.

Disinformation is becoming one of the most serious security challenges for the European Union, especially in the context of the deteriorating geopolitical situation. In recent years, disinformation has evolved from a marginal phenomenon to a systematically used tool of influence and manipulation, which disrupts the functioning of democratic societies, undermines trust in democratic values, principles and institutions and destabilizes social cohesion. Both state and non-state actors use disinformation to achieve their political, ideological, security and economic goals without direct military confrontation. The European Union is responding to these threats with comprehensive political, legislative and strategic measures, including the European Democracy Action Plan, the Digital Services Act and the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, among others. Strengthening societal resilience through the development of media and digital literacy, critical thinking and pluralistic public discourse also plays a key role. The analysis shows that an effective and efficient fight against disinformation necessarily requires a coordinated and broad-spectrum response that respects democratic principles and values, but at the same time minimizes the space for abuse of the information environment.

This paper examines how large language models can be embedded in governable agentic workflows for defence decision support. It argues that reliability and accountability in such systems depend on workflow architecture, not only on model capability. Building on the author’s earlier I→E→R model, the paper proposes an audit-first governance framework with three layers: explicit task decomposition, evidence grounding with provenance, and bounded control with logging and authorization gates. The framework is specified through five inspectable roles, four design variables, and bounded autonomy as the guiding design principle. The contribution is conceptual: it defines conditions under which agentic analytical processes can remain transparent, traceable, reconstructable, and auditable, and prepares the framework for later case-study or proof-of-concept evaluation.

By exploiting the potential of social media, disinformation has become an important element of warfare. The region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is particularly vulnerable to disinformation, primarily from Russia. One of the reasons for Russia’s activities in this region’s infosphere is that most CEE countries are members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, Russian disinformation activities aimed at the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) are particularly interesting. The image of the 3SI created in the media is crucial, for it translates into how the public understands, perceives and recalls this format of cooperation. The article aims to reconstruct the image of the 3SI in cases of Russian disinformation identified by the European External Action Service within the EUvsDisinfo project. The article’s methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis of disinformation cases identified by EUvsDisinfo. The article identifies four main frames of disinformation targeting the 3SI, showing that Russian disinformation is focused on undermining the credibility and integrity of this cooperation, both among Initiative countries and between them and their international partners.