Gintaras Šumskas[*], *Irmina Matonytė*[**]
General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania[***]

Impact of the Mass Media
on the Assessment of Military Threats[****]

On the grounds of the theories of the use of the mass media, the authors analyse concepts and assessments of military threats. The analysis is based on the data of representative public opinion polls (conducted in spring 2016 by Vilmorus, N = 1004). The research shows that certain qualities of individual political competence strengthen the impact of the media, that the tabloid press, Russian TV and the quality press affect concepts of military threats, and that sets of factors shaping the concepts of various military threats are different. The extent of the mass media impact is influenced mostly by an individual's ethnic background, education, income, participation in elections, political education, inter-personal communication on political topics as well as a leftist–rightist self-identification.

Introduction

Assurance of national security and social welfare essentially rests on the country's membership in NATO and the EU. However, Lithuania's membership in NATO and the EU does not eliminate Russia as one of the most important challenges to Lithuania's statehood.[1] Developments over the last decade (the expansion of radical Islamic terrorism, Russia's military aggression against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, the migration of refugees from the Middle East into the EU, Russia's informational attacks against politicians and institu-

---

[*] *Dr. Gintaras* Šumskas is an assistant professor at the Vytautas Magnus University. Address for correspondence: V. Putvinskio 23-604, LT-44243 Kaunas, Lithuania; tel. 8-37-206704, e-mail: gintaras.sumskas@vdu.lt
[**] *Dr. Irmina Matonytė* is a Professor of the Political Science Department, Military Academy of Lithuania. Address for correspondence: Šilo 5A., LT-10322 Vilnius, Lithuania; tel. 8-5-2103582, e-mail irmina.matonyte@lka.lt .
[1] Miniotaitė G. (2007), „Lithuania's Evolving Security and Defence Policy: Problems and Prospects", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2006*, p. 171-192.; Miniotaitė G. (2011), „Europeanization Tendencies of the Foreign and Security Policy of the Baltic States", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2010/11*, p. 101-120.; Šešelgytė M. (2010), "Security culture of Lithuania", *Lithuanian foreign policy review* 24, p. 23-40.; Jurkynas M. (2014), "Security concerns of the Baltic States in the Twenty-first century" in Archer C. et al. eds. (2014). *Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond*, London: Routledge, p. 113-129.

tions of Lithuania and other Western member states, etc.) make it mandatory to go deep into wide-spectrum threats. It is not without cause that the attention of Lithuanian researchers and experts towards national security problems and threat concepts has grown.[2] The concept of hybrid warfare is gradually becoming established in the public discourse[3] of the country, more attention is paid to the identification and prevention of threats in strategic documents and public policy, and the development of civil awareness is enhanced.[4]

Considerations and assessments of threats to security and welfare are an important part of collective identity while categorical defining of problems and challenges is the basis of any organized society.[5] In terms of threats, interest is often paid not only to the issues of national and personal security discussed as topics of international relations but also to political, social and economic problems, religious and moral dilemmas, etc. While analysing security challenges (1991), Buzan distinguished five sectors: political, military, economic, public and environmental protection. According to Buzan, the essence of a *societal* security problem is a systemic security problem in which both individuals and states as well as the international system are important and in which economic, social and environmental factors are as significant as military and political ones. Following this attitude, security levels and sectors are distinguished and they are useful as certain observation platforms from which one can look at the problem from different angles; yet, they do not constitute autonomous areas of political analysis.[6] While expanding the ideas raised by Buzan, emphasis is placed on constellations of security factors and on the fact that mezzo-level

[2] Kolaja L. Keršanskas V. (2015), "The impact of the conflict in Ukraine on Lithuanian security dvelopment", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2013*, p. 171-189.; Janušauskienė D., Vileikienė E., Nevinskaitė L., Gečienė-Janulionė I. (2017), *Ar Lietuvos gyventojai jaučiasi saugūs? Subjektyvus saugumas geopolitiniame kontekste*, Vilnius: LSTC, 148 p.; Janušauskienė D., Vileikienė E., Nevinskaitė L., Gečienė-Janulionė I. (2017), „Subjektyvus grėsmių suvokimas: ar Lietuvos gyventojai jaučiasi saugūs?", *Filosofija, Sociologija* 28 (2), p. 99-108.; Matonytė I., Morkevičius V., Lašas A., Jankauskaitė V. (2017), „Grėsmių visuomenės gerovei suvokimas: socialinio optimizmo, socialinio ir institucinio pasitikėjimo bei pasitikėjimo savimi įtaka", *Politologija* 1 (85), p. 3-52.; Ramonaitė A., Skirkevičius P., Vosylius E. (2018), *Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos? Pilietinio pasipriešinimo prielaidos ir galimybės*, Vilnius: Aukso žuvys, 200 p.
[3] Bajarūnas E., Keršanskas V. (2017), *Hibridinės grėsmės: kas tai ir kaip turime veikti?*, pranešimas Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademijos konferencijoje „Lietuvos saugumas ir gynybos politika", vykusioje 2017 m. lapkričio 10 d., LR Krašto apsaugos ministerijoje.
[4] LR Seimo 2017 m. sausio 17 d. nutarimas Nr. XIII-202 (2017), *Nacionalinio saugumo strategija*; LR Krašto apsaugos ministerija (2018), *Grėsmių nacionaliniam saugumui vertinimas*; Aleksa K. (2017), *Ką turime žinoti apie pasipriešinimą: Aktyvių veiksmų gairės*, LR Krašto apsaugos ministerija, 3 leidimas.
[5] Matonytė I., Morkevičius V., Lašas A., Jankauskaitė V. (2017), „Grėsmių visuomenės gerovei suvokimas: socialinio optimizmo, socialinio ir institucinio pasitikėjimo bei pasitikėjimo savimi įtaka", *Politologija,* 1 (85), p. 3-52.
[6] Buzan B. (1991), *People, States and Fear (2nd ed.): An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, L. Rienner Publishers.

political units – not necessarily states – are inclined to construct each other as threats[7] and that in the act of that constructed threat both the act of speech and actually conducted policy are important.[8]

It is noticeable that in the modern complex world, global, national and local-level challenges and military-nature threats are growing while their prevention (the identification and deterrence of an aggressor's destructive actions) is becoming ever more complex. Moreover, sources and triggers of threats are distinguished that are targeted and purposeful and, on the other hand, diffused, mired and scattered.[9]

On the grounds of public opinion polls, analysts working on the perception of insecurities particularly emphasize the role of the mass media. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris distinguish five groups of 'hard' factors that shape the perception of insecurity (global- and national-level threats, community-level threats, individual-level risks, guarantees of social protection and risks broadcasted and communicated by the media) and three groups of 'soft' factors that affect the perception of insecurity (social tolerance and trust, religiousness and secularization as well as political views and values).[10]

Psychologists and analysts of post-traumatic experiences distinguish four interrelated groups of variables linked to the quality of life (economic, social, communal and informational) on which the resilience of society and the individual to catastrophes and accidents depends.[11] The authors emphasize that the resilience of society is enhanced solely by that information and communication that subjects relate to trustworthy information sources, effective information transfer mechanisms and the unifying collective narrative. It is obvious that in shaping the resilience of society the mass media (including social networks) is assigned a significant role.

Starting with the classical remarks uttered by Walter Lippmann at the beginning of the 20th century stating that the "world outside and the pictures in our heads"[12] are connected through the content of news media, empirical mass media research eventually made it possible to develop a theory of the media's

---

[7] Buzan B., Wæver O. (2009), "Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory", *Review of International Studies* 4, p. 253-276.

[8] Balzacq Th., Léonard S., Ruzicka J. (2016), "Securitization' revisited: theory and cases", *International Relations* 30 (4), p. 494-531.

[9] McSweeney, B. (1999), Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[10] Inglehart, R. F. and Norris, P. (2012), "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Understanding Human Security", *Scandinavian Political Studies* 35, p. 71-96.

[11] Norris F., Galea S., Friedman M., Watson P. (2006), *"Methods for Disaster Mental Health Research"*, New York: Guilford Press.

[12] Lippmann, W. (1922), *Public Opinion*, New York: MacMillan Co.

role in agenda-setting, which accentuates that media content is particularly important in terms of topics that the audience has no direct experience of[13], i.e. opinions about foreign policy, international relations, national security and defence. Correspondingly, there is a great need in society for information in this area. Therefore, it is important to analyse how much and what the media broadcasts, and what impact the information presented by it has on the connection identified by Lippmann as the "world outside and the pictures in our heads".

Nevertheless, it is important to point out an opposite aspect noticed by communication specialists: people select news media sources and information not 'automatically' and randomly but in compliance with the attitudes they already have and the routines and traditions they are accustomed to. In other words, they seek selective exposure of information[14] thus avoiding news that contradicts their convictions and create conditions for tailoring the information to the attitudes and convictions they already have.[15]

Thus, communication specialists recognize two contradictory tendencies in mass-media consumption and its impact. One declares that there is great demand for information communication that is realized in compliance with the pluralistic and independent principles of the media where the focus is on operative information, accuracy and quality. The other claims that media communications do not compete freely because audiences have grouped in advance and follow certain information sources that disseminate the information and its interpretation corresponding to the convictions of 'their own' audience. These two theses combine with the 'cultivation theory' according to which the individual choice of the media source is partly determined by the attitudes people have and information received from the news media reinforces these attitudes.[16] Incidentally, Denny McQuail underlines that in covering communication in the most varied formats, modern mass media are not capable of comprehensively controlling the impact it exerts because, on the one hand, the impact can be short term and long term, whereas on the other hand media representatives may purposefully seek certain impacts while some consequences arise without any deliberate intentions (or are even opposite to them) (see Fig.1)

[13] McCombs, M. (2004), *Setting the Agenda: the Mass Media and Public Opinion*, Oxford: Polity.

[14] Stroud N.J. (2008), "Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Concept of Selective Exposure", *Political Behavior* 30, p. 341-366.

[15] Bryant J., Oliver M.B. (2009), *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research*. 3rd edition, New York: Routledge, p. 523-524.

[16] McQuail, D. (2010), *McQuail's mass communication theory*, London: SAGE Publications, p. 463.

INTENTIONALITY
Planned effects

Propaganda

Individual response

Development
diffusion

Media campaign

News diffusion

News learning

Framing

Diffusion of innovations

Agenda
setting

Distribution of
knowledge

TIME   Short term

Long term

Social control

Socialization

Individual reaction

Event outcomes

Collective reaction

Reality defining

Institutional change

Policy effects

Displacement   Cultural and social change

Social integration

Unplanned effects

Figure 1. **Typology of Media Effects according to McQuail (2010)[17]**

In general, communication specialists note that news media users are not 'omnivorous', i.e., on the one hand they choose (consciously or unconsciously) their media use strategies, while on the other hand their capability and inclination to coordinate potentially contradictory images and interpretations provided by different information sources are limited. In this article, the authors go deeper into whether (how) the use of different media sources affects the assessment of military threats – what social and political factors strengthen (weaken) the impact of the news media on the images of military threats.

1. Overview of the research

It is important to understand the levers of threat concepts and their operation because these concepts may have some influence on the support of citizens concerning various public policy decisions. It has been noted that people who are

---

[17] *Ibidem.*

susceptible to the fear of terrorists are more inclined to renounce some of their civil liberties in exchange for greater security[18], and they are more inclined to agree that a greater share of the state budget be allocated to the national defence.[19]

Studies analysing the factors shaping threat concepts can be grouped into several categories. On the one hand, following the aforementioned Buzan's theory[20], focus is often given to the analysis of exceptional threats (terrorism, ecological catastrophes, military invasions, etc.) and combinations of socio-demographic characteristics, factors of individual and collective experience, etc. increasing (or decreasing) the probability of the threat. Among the research of such topical threats, there is that which goes deeper into the impact of the news media on threat images. For example, an experiment conducted in Israel established that a 12-minute TV reportage on terrorism considerably increased the level of viewers' anxiety in terms of terrorism.[21] However, other researchers, on the grounds of the data of public opinion polls conducted in the USA, did not establish that watching TV news covering the topic of terrorism could significantly affect the fear perceived by people.[22] It is obvious that the external validity of these two studies is debatable; social experiences in terms of terrorism in both Israel and the USA are unique. On the other hand, these and similar studies have revealed that assessments of military threats are affected by both the socio-demographic characteristics of the individual and the individual's sense of self-efficacy. Huddy, alongside a group of researchers has determined that less educated people tend to make a big deal out of a terrorism threat.[23] Other research has disclosed that men less than women tend to acknowledge terrorism threats.[24] Ridout et al. revealed the significance of political convictions to the perception of threats: in the US population, the leftists (Liberals and Democrats) give more points to such threats as the

---

[18] Davis D., Silver B. (2004), "Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorists Attacks on America", *American Journal of Political Science* 48, p. 28-46.

[19] Albertson B., Kushner S. G. (2015), *Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World*, New York: Cambridge university press.

[20] Buzan B. (1991), *People, States and Fear (2nd ed.): An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, L. Rienner Publishers.

[21] Slone M. (2000), "Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, p. 508-522.

[22] Rubin A., Haridakis P., Hullman G., Sun S., Chikombero P., Pornsakulvanich V. (2003), "Television Exposure not Predicative of Terrorism Fear", *Newspaper Research Journal* 24, p. 128-145.

[23] Huddy L., Feldman S., Taber Ch., Lahav G. (2005), "Threat, Anxiety and Support for Anti-Terrorist Policies", *American Journal of Political Science* 49, p. 593-608.

[24] Davis D., Silver B. (2004), "Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorists Attacks on America", *American Journal of Political Science* 48, p. 28-46.; Ridout T.N., Grosse A.C., Appleton A.M. (2008), "News Media Use and Americans' Perceptions of Global Threat", *British Journal of Political Science* 38(4), p. 575-593.

warming of the climate, the demographic explosion and religious fanaticism than the rightists (Conservatives and Republicans).[25] Ainius Lašas along with a group of scientists revealed in 2017 that military factors look more threatening to people with lower incomes and to people living in the countryside (rural areas).[26] Matonytė and her colleagues noted that women more than men are apt to assign more significance to economic, social, health-related and moral-religious problems.[27]

Studies on threat concepts having a greater generalization potential concentrate on the topic of criminality and often substantiate the insight of the cultivation theory revealing that intensive use of the mass media (particularly watching TV that depicts a dangerous and violent world) strengthens the assessment of threats.[28] However, the cultivation thesis was rejected in research conducted in Australia and Iceland on threat images via the theme of criminality covered in the news media.[29]

In a thematic analysis of the connections of topical threats with use of the news media in the Lithuanian context, a study by Diana Janušauskienė and her colleagues published in 2017 is worth mentioning. The researchers studied the data of representative national opinion polls indicating that in 2016 more than half of the population of Lithuania considered Russia as unfriendly to the Lithuanian state (the opposite opinion was expressed by only 14 percent); 44 percent of the population perceived Russia as a country posing a threat to Lithuania (Janušauskienė et al. 2017, 43-44). The attitudes of ethnic groups living in Lithuania were perceptibly different; the majority of Lithuanians considered Russia as hostile and threatening, but this opinion was shared by only 28 percent of Poles and 9 percent of Russians.[30] The research data also revealed a great

[25] Ridout T.N., Grosse A.C., Appleton A.M. (2008), "News Media Use and Americans' Perceptions of Global Threat", *British Journal of Political Science* 38(4), p. 575-593.

[26] Jakučionis S. (2017). „Tyrimas: lietuviai labiausiai nerimauja dėl ekonominių ir socialinių grėsmių", https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/tyrimas-lietuviai-labiausiai-nerimauja-del-ekonominiu-ir-socialiniu-gresmiu-56-812736, 2017 birželio 15d., žiūrėta 2018.07.12; Lašas A., Matonytė I., Jankauskaitė V. (2017), "Threat Means Threat? Perceptive Differentiation between Targeted and Diffused Military Threats", nepublikuotas mokslinio straipsnio rankraštis.

[27] Matonytė I., Morkevičius V., Lašas A., Jankauskaitė V. (2017), „Grėsmių visuomenės gerovei suvokimas: socialinio optimizmo, socialinio ir institucinio pasitikėjimo bei pasitikėjimo savimi įtaka", *Politologija,* 1 (85), p. 3-52.

[28] Gross K., Aday S. (2003), "The Scary World in Your Living Room and Neighborhood: Using Local Broadcast News, Neighborhood Crime Rates and Personal Experience to Test Agenda Setting and Cultivation", *Journal of Communication* 53, p. 411-426.; Valkenburg, P. M., Peter, J., Walther, J. B. (2016), "Media Effects: Theory and Research", *Annual Review of Psychology* 67, p. 315-338.

[29] Ridout T.N., Grosse A.C., Appleton A.M. (2008), "News Media Use and Americans' Perceptions of Global Threat", *British Journal of Political Science* 38(4), p. 579.

[30] Janušauskienė D., Vileikienė E., Nevinskaitė L., Gečienė-Janulionė I. (2017), *Ar Lietuvos gyventojai jaučiasi saugūs? Subjektyvus saugumas geopolitiniame kontekste*, Vilnius: LSTC, p. 44.

mismatch between the attitudes of Lithuanians and of national minorities living in Lithuania to Russian foreign and security policy; two thirds of Lithuanians, approximately the same number of Poles (60 percent) and only 18 percent of Russians did not justify the Russian annexation of the Crimea.[31] The study pointed out that in the opinion of ethnic Russians the threat of Russia is made to look too significant in Lithuanian policy and the news media and, consequently, the hostility towards Russia is overheated[32], while the most important socio-demographic factors determining a more favourable attitude to Russia are ethnicity (a Russian or a Pole), and the age of the respondent (56 years or more) also has an influence (though a small one) as does gender (women). Individuals' financial situation and education, while controlling other factors, had no impact on the assessment of the threat posed to Lithuania by Russia.[33]

The authors did not include the study of the news media factor into the regression analysis model but analysed it separately resting on the aforementioned thesis of selective exposure stating that the attitudes people had previously determine choices of the media source.[34] Correspondingly, the authors determined that the consumption of news via Russian information sources made a difference of 25-30 percentage points in assessing the threat of Russia. Incidentally, the correlation also remains in controlling the factor of the ethnicity; Lithuanians who watch Russian TV channels more often assess Russia more favourably. The use of newspapers, radio and Internet news portals in Russian is also related (albeit in a weaker way) to a more favourable assessment of Russia.[35]

On the other hand, while following the aforementioned complex international security theory by Buzan, some studies go deeper into the combinations of threats of a varied nature and aggregated assessments of threats. For example, on the basis of opinion polls in the USA, using the factor analysis Ridout determines that threats can be grouped into traditional (economic recession, large-scale warfare, use of weapons of mass destruction) and non-traditional (global warming, the growing population, religious fanaticism). This research showed that for an understanding of traditional threats, use of the mass media does not have such a significant impact as in the case of non-traditional threats. Doing research into the media impact on the concepts of threats, Ridout and a group of scientists controlled the 'global knowledge' as well, i.e., how deep is an individual's awareness of political issues? They made the assumption that the news

---

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 45.
[32] *Ibidem*, p. 45 – 46.
[33] *Ibidem*, p. 51 – 52.
[34] *Ibidem*, p. 52.
[35] *Ibidem*, p. 57.

media would have a smaller influence on a more politically aware person than on someone who is unable to perceive information presented in the media in a broader context.[36] This political competence variable mediating the impact of the media can be traced to Zaller's classical work which reveals that public opinion is not just an echo of what is published in the media and that the impact of the media is rather limited and depends on how much attention the person devotes to it, what his/her 'global knowledge' is, and also that people's attitudes to various issues are not stable and, while making decisions on various issues they base them on ideas that are the most urgent for them (and are not necessarily disseminated in the news media).[37] Considering the index that sums up six mass media sources (cable, national and local TV, reading newspapers and news on the Internet, listening to the radio) as an indicator of media use Ridout et al. determined that in the case of an aggregated global complex threat, the political awareness of the individual is not directly related to how he/she assesses a threat.[38] However, at the same time it was determined that individuals with high political competences tended to give more points when assessing threats whereas people with low political competences tended to give lower points to assessing threats. Thus, it is possible to state that a certain threshold level of basic political education is necessary for the perception and assessment of threats, while in the opposite case, even in hearing about a threat via the news media an individual cannot adequately assess the threat.

Having divided traditional and non-traditional categories of threats into separate groups, Ridout with his colleagues determined that political awareness decreases the assessments of traditional threats: the greater the cognition of the world, the smaller the significance of these threats. Use of the media did not have an influence on the assessment of traditional threats. However, together with this, media use had a great influence on the assessment of non-traditional threats (global warming, demographic explosion, religious fanaticism); the greater the use of media, the more comprehensive the assessment of the threats. However, the political awareness of the individual did not influence the perception of non-traditional threats. Thus, on the grounds of Ridout and colleagues' research, it is possible to generally state that the effect of the media on the perception of threats is not universal. Deep political awareness enhan-

---

[36] Ridout T.N., Grosse A.C., Appleton A.M. (2008), "News Media Use and Americans' Perceptions of Global Threat", *British Journal of Political Science* 38(4), p. 575-593.

[37] Zaller, J. (1992), *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[38] Ridout T.N., Grosse A.C., Appleton A.M. (2008), "News Media Use and Americans' Perceptions of Global Threat", *British Journal of Political Science* 38(4), p. 575-593.

ces the impact of the media. The impact of the media is greater in the case of assessing non-traditional threats. The research by Ridout et al. contains a shortcoming, however. It measures media use by an aggregated index although the press can likely present information in a different way (more positively, analytically) than TV (more negatively, visualizing sensations). So the media's different sources can affect assessments of threats in different directions.

Doubts in terms of the conceptual mismatch in one of the indexes of media use are also raised in the use of social networks for the search for information to interpret the impact to which it is necessary to return to the classical insights of 'two-step flow of communication'.[39] It is noteworthy that social networks can function as both the 'first' step of the communication chain (and the only one, i.e. as a hypodermic syringe directly injecting news and attitudes communicated via the media) and as the 'second', opening up possibilities for the interpersonal communication and discussion of news within a friendly circle and, thus, decreasing the direct impact of the mass media. Innovative yet scanty empirical studies reveal that modern social media platforms (such as, for example, Twitter or Facebook) have a tendency to operate as the 'second' step in the complex flow of communication.[40]

If threats as variables are grouped not by researchers but by respondents' answers, the aforementioned research by Janušauskienė, for example, determined that in Lithuania it is possible to distinguish four groups of security problems: a) military and political problems; b) natural disasters and broad-scope violence; c) social problems; and d) economic and energy problems.[41] However, the latter study more extensively analysed links with the mass-media use of only one variable – of Russia as a threat (see above).

Matonytė and a group of scientists analysed the data of another representative Lithuanian public opinion poll conducted in spring 2016.[42] Respondents answered one question about the danger of aggregated military and ot-

[39] Katz, E., Lazarsfeld P. (1955), *Personal Influence*, New York: Free Press; Фролова Н. (2018), "СССР перешел в онлайн и живет в ОК: что происходит в виртуальном Русском мире Балтии" [Sovietų Sąjunga persikėlė on-line ir gyvena OK: kas vyksta virtualiajame Baltijos Rusų pasaulyje], 2018.06.28, http://rus.delfi.ee/daily/estonia/sssr-pereshel-v-onlajn-i-zhivet-v-ok-chto-proishodit-v-virtualnom-russkom-mire-baltii?id=8286431, žiūrėta 2018.07.12.

[40] Vos T.P., Heinderyckx F. (2015), *Gatekeeping in Transition*, New York: Routledge.; Hilbert, M., Vasquez, J., Halpern, D., Valenzuela, S., & Arriagada, E. (2016), "One Step, Two Step, Network Step? Complementary Perspectives on Communication Flows in Twittered Citizen Protests", Social Science Computer Review 35 (4), p. 444 – 461.

[41] Janušauskienė D., Vileikienė E., Nevinskaitė L., Gečienė-Janulionė I. (2017), *Ar Lietuvos gyventojai jaučiasi saugūs? Subjektyvus saugumas geopolitiniame kontekste*, Vilnius: LSTC, p. 31-32.

[42] Matonytė I., Morkevičius V., Lašas A., Jankauskaitė V. (2017), „Grėsmių visuomenės gerovei suvokimas: socialinio optimizmo, socialinio ir institucinio pasitikėjimo bei pasitikėjimo savimi įtaka", *Politologija* 1 (85), p. 34.

her (social, economic, etc.) threats (assessment on a 5-point scale, where 1 is very little danger and 5 is very great danger) and 46 'closed' questions amongst which there was the assessment of different threats to the welfare of Lithuanian society. The probability of the manifestation of each of the 46 topical threats and the extent of its eventual impact were assessed separately. An 8-point scale was used for the assessment (from 'no threat' – 0 points, to 1 point – very low probability, to 7 points – very high probability). The threats were identified following the risk assessment methodology of the World Economic Forum and taking into account analysis conducted in Lithuania of the threat discourse in the country's news media. All of the distinguished threats were grouped into seven categories (military, political, economic, social, ecological, health-related, and religious and moral). Each category comprised five to seven specific threats. While researching the seven threat categories, the authors determined certain regularities, for example a dependence between the social optimism and the assessments of the extent of the threat's impact or between confidence in public institutions and assessments of the economic, health-related, political and moral-religious threats. Matonytė et al. pointed out that images of military threats in Lithuanian public opinion make up a separate threat category to the assessment of which trust in various forms as well as the difference between materialist and post-materialist values has little influence. However, in the article the authors did not explore the factor of the mass media, although they acknowledged that it could be very important (or even essential) in shaping personal social optimism and the assessments of threats.[43]

On the grounds of the same representative Lithuanian public opinion polls, another research article was prepared where according to the origin of source, in the large set of military threats, targeted (here, Russia's military invasion) and diffuse (here, the decreasing level of national security and NATO disintegration) are distinguished.[44] Lašas and his colleagues reveal that confidence in national-level institutions (the Lithuanian Armed Forces) and international ones (NATO and the EU) is rather significant when speaking about specific (targeted) military threats but its significance decreases in the case of diffuse threats and military threats with no single source .[45] As far as the issue of the influence of the media on the assessment of threats is concerned, the authors explored only the impact of watching Russian TV (coded using the dichotomy of 'yes' or 'no') on the assessment of the probability of Russia's invasion of Lithuania. They found

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 28.
[44] Lašas A., Matonytė I., Jankauskaitė V. (2017), "Threat Means Threat? Perceptive Differentiation between Targeted and Diffused Military Threats ", unpublished manuscript of the academic article.
[45] *Ibidem.*

that the impact is not great and stable and is weaker than that of other factors controlled in the linear regression model (attitudes to the soviet times, interpersonal trust, political ideology, etc.). The impact of watching Russian TV was practically not detected in the case of the assessment of diffuse military threats.

2. Presentation of empirical research

On the grounds of the surveyed academic literature and empirical research, we can formulate several propositions that need checking:

- the assessment of aggregated military threats is weakly related to mass-media use;
- the use of different mass-media sources affects the assessment of targeted military threats more strongly than the assessment of diffuse military threats;
- the use of different mass-media sources affects the assessment of various military threats negatively (decreases);
- the impact of the mass media on concepts of military threats is enhanced by an individual's low political competence;
- the impact of the mass media on concepts of military threats is enhanced by an individual's rightist political attitudes;
- the impact of the mass media on concepts of military threats is enhanced by an individual's low social status;
- the impact of the mass media on concepts of military threats is enhanced by an individual belonging to the non-titular (in Lithuania, Lithuanian) nationality.

Keeping in mind the fact that the assessments of military threats are shaped by numerous factors, alongside regression analysis one more method of structural equation modelling was chosen for the analysis. An alternative method, such as regression analysis (on which most of the research discussed in the above survey rests) has certain limitations. The linear regression can show the overall and individual impact of independent variables on a dependent variable but is unable to measure the indirect impact of certain variables. Let us say that the nationality of the individual and the press he reads published in the language of the national minority can have a certain (decreasing or increasing) impact on the assessment of political issues (including military threats) expressed by that person. Regression analysis can record the individual importance of these factors, but the indirect effect (i.e., how the individual's nationality affects his threat assessments formed via reading the national mi-

nority press) will not be substantiated. The 'path analysis' link introduced in the models of structural equations settles this problem by making it possible to measure how a person's nationality affects the attitudes he expresses not only directly but also through the *proxy* variable of national minority press use. Thus, it is possible to record the direct and indirect impacts of independent and control the variables on the dependent variable.

The above-enumerated seven propositions (hypotheses) are tested by analysing the empirical research data of Lithuanian public opinion polls conducted between 27 February and 10 March 2016 by the Vilmorus Market and Opinion Research Centre. The sample consisted of 1,004 respondents (18 years of age or more) from 19 urban and 28 rural areas. Their average age was 51 (standard deviation, 18) and women made up 52.3 percent of the sample.[46]

The different measurements of mass-media use and political competence in our research are reflected in public opinion poll data related to these issues:

- socio-demographic qualities: age, gender, nationality, education, employment (jobless), subjective assessment of income and place of residence;
- political competence: self-identification on the political left-right scale, the importance of politics and interpersonal communication on political topics, the person's political education, participation in non-governmental organizations, voting in elections (original questions provided in Appendix 2);
- use of mass-media sources: following the news on the radio/TV, the printed press, social networks, the consumption of quality analytical news media (weeklies and monthlies), the tabloid press (publications belonging to the news media group Respublika), Delfi, 15 Minutes; Lrytas, Alfa.lt, Russian TV.

The descriptive analysis indicates that 33 percent of the respondents consider military threats as a moderate danger (12 percent a very big danger, 22 percent a big danger, 12 percent a very small danger, 19 percent a small danger). See Appendix 1.

The descriptive data analysis reveals (see Table 1) that demographic factors have no great influence on the assessment of military threats. Keeping in mind the rather clear source of a potential 'targeted' military threat (Russia, in terms of historical and geopolitical circumstances), the connection of ethnicity with the perception of threats is predictable (persons of the Lithuanian nationality give the possibility of military threats more points). On the other hand,

---

[46] Matonytė I., Morkevičius V., Lašas A., Jankauskaitė V. (2017), „Grėsmių visuomenės gerovei suvokimas: socialinio optimizmo, socialinio ir institucinio pasitikėjimo bei pasitikėjimo savimi įtaka", *Politologija* 1 (85), p. 3-52.

the authors note that the perception of all controlled military threats is related to the place of residence, education and income (respondents from rural areas, having lower education and lower income – rather dissatisfied with the income they receive – give higher assessments to the threats).[47]

Table 1. **Assessment of Military Threat Probabilities in Various Demographic Groups**

		Probability of Russian Military Intervention (average 0-7)	Probability of Disintegration of NATO Alliance (average scores 0-7)	Probability of Decreasing level of National security (average scores 0-7)	Probability of Military Threats During the next 10 Years (average scores 1 – 5)
Age group	<=50	3,5	3,0	3,7	3,1
	51+	3,4	2,9	3,9	3,0
Nationality:	Lithuanian	*3,6*	3,0	*3,8*	*3,1*
	Russian	1,8	2,5	3,1	2,0
	Polish	2,5	2,9	3,4	2,4
Education:	University / unfinished university education	3,4	2,8	3,8	3,0
	Higher school / secondary education	3,4	3,0	3,8	3,0
	Unfinished secondary education	3,9	*3,4*	3,9	3,1
Self-assessment on household's financial status	With current income we are coping quite prosperously	3,3	3,0	3,9	2,9
	We can easily coping with current income	3,2	2,7	3,6	3,0
	We have some difficulties coping with the current income	3,6	*3,1*	*3,9*	3,2
	We are very hardly coping with current income	3,5	*3,4*	*4,0*	3,1
Place of Residence	Vilnius	3,1	2,9	3,6	3,0
	Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai, Panevėžys	3,5	2,7	3,9	3,1
	Other City	3,0	3,2	3,6	2,9
	Rural area	*4,0*	3,0	*4,0*	*3,2*

[47] Data indicates that in the rural areas (settlements with less than 2000 inhabitants) as much as 95% of respondents declared to be of Lithuanian nationality. In rural areas 16% of respondents had university or college (including unfinished education) education (as compared with 47% in Vilnius).65% of inhabitants in rural areas declared that their economic status is unsatisfactory (in Vilnius – 40%).

3. Impact of the mass media on assessments of military threats. Models of analysis

In this article, for an analysis of military threats indicators of probability assessment are chosen (in the models: dependent variables). These indicators cover aggregated-level threats (without specifically identifying the threats) and topical threats (by additionally distinguishing targeted and diffuse threats). The operationalization of dependent variables:

- a danger of military threat[48] (aggregated threat)
- Russian invasion[49] (topical, targeted threat, clear source of threat)
- NATO disintegration[50] (topical threat, many sources of threat)
- a decrease in national security[51] (ambiguous, diffuse threat, many sources of threat)

The results of the regression analysis indicate that Russian TV and the tabloid press affect the perception of military threats. The consumption of TV and radio also affects rather significantly the assessment of military threats, but it is difficult to comment on its impact (as different TV and radio channels are not singled out in the question). It is possible to state that news broadcasts in video and audio formats affect the concepts of threats more than, for example, news published in the printed media. For the concepts of military threats, the variables of personal political self-identification on the leftist-rightist scale, interpersonal communication on political topics and participation in political (voting in elections) and public life (involvement in the activities of non-governmental organizations) are important as well. Rightist voters, respondents interested in politics, communicating on political themes, participating in non-governmental organizations and those who are self-determined to vote tend to give more points to military threats (their probability).

It is interesting that the correlation of military threat assessment is in reverse to an individual's political education (index) – the more politically educated the person is, the fewer assessment points he gives to military threats. Still, this connection is fairly weak and unstable. The demographic criteria (larger income, university education, urban residence) indicate that a higher social status and a general level of political education reduce the assessment of threats. Assessing demographic criteria separately, the most significant variable affecting the assessment of military threats is ethnicity.

---

[48] The question on general military threat probability. Average scores on 1-5 scale.
[49] Average scores on 0-7 scale.
[50] Average scores on 0-7 scale.
[51] Average scores on 0-7 scale.

Table 2. **Perceptions of Probabilities of Military Threats and Media Channels (regression analysis)**

	Probability of Military Threats During the next 10 Years	Probability of Russian Military Intervention	Probability of Disintegration of NATO Alliance	Probability of Decreasing level of National security
Demography				
Gender	0,04 (0,63)	0,11 (0,43)	-0,07 (0,60)	0,19 (0,12)
Age	0,00 (0,44)	0,00 (0,58)	0,00 (0,76)	0,00 (0,32)
Income	*-0,47 (0,01)*	*-0,94 (0,00)*	*-0,72 (0,01)*	*-0,77 (0,00)*
Education (other=0; university/college=1)	-0,12 (0,27)	-0,15 (0,37)	-0,01 (0,96)	-0,10 (0,48)
Place of Residence (rural=0; urban=1)	*-0,18 (0,06)*	*-0,66 (0,00)*	-0,21 (0,17)	*-0,26 (0,05)*
Employment Status (other=0; unemployed=1)	-0,05 (0,61)	*-0,24 (0,10)*	-0,03 (0,83)	0,02 (0,90)
Poles (other=0; Poles=1)	*-0,71 (0,00)*	*-0,98 (0,01)*	-0,02 (0,95)	-0,23 (0,50)
Russians (other=0; Russian=1)	*-0,96 (0,00)*	*-1,33 (0,00)*	*-0,59 (0,07)*	*-0,65 (0,02)*
Ideological Orientation and Political Competences				
Self-Identification on Ideological Left-Right Scale (left =1; right=10)	*0,09 (0,00)*	*0,11 (0,00)*	-0,03 (0,42)	0,01 (0,74)
Importance of Politics (not important at all=1, very important=4)	0,07 (0,22)	*0,23 (0,01)*	-0,05 (0,61)	-0,01 (0,93)
Communication on Political Topics (never=1, occasionally=2, often=3)	0,08 (0,30)	0,09 (0,49)	-0,11 (0,40)	*0,20 (0,07)*
Political Education (indeksas; 0-5)	-0,02 (0,49)	*-0,09 (0,08)*	*-0,08 (0,10)*	0,02 (0,74)
Participation in any Civil Organization (0=ne; 1=taip)	0,07 (0,61)	0,13 (0,50)	-0,06 (0,77)	0,10 (0,58)
Self-Determination to vote (undecided / abstain to vote=0; determined to vote vote=1)	*0,19 (0,08)*	0,12 (0,48)	0,05 (0,74)	*0,28 (0,06)*
Media Channels				
Radio and TV News (never=1; daily=5)	*-0,08 (0,06)*	*-0,14 (0,04)*	*-0,13 (0,05)*	*-0,13 (0,03)*
Printed Press (never=1; daily=5)	0,03 (0,30)	0,04 (0,39)	-0,02 (0,60)	0,05 (0,24)
Internet Social Networks (never=1; daily=5)	0,00 (0,92)	*0,08 (0,10)*	-0,06 (0,20)	0,03 (0,47)
Quality Analytical Printed Press (other=0; Verslo klase, Valstybė, Veidas, IQ, Politika ir Verslas=1)	0,16 (0,50)	0,45 (0,22)	-0,06 (0,88)	0,11 (0,73)
Tabloid Press (other=0; "Respublika" group Press=1)	*-0,25 (0,05)*	*-0,42 (0,03)*	*-0,57 (0,00)*	*-0,48 (0,01)*

Delfi.lt (other=0; yes=1)	0,10 (0,32)	-0,02 (0,91)	0,00 (1,00)	-0,09 (0,51)
15min.lt (other=0; yes=1)	-0,03 (0,85)	-0,09 (0,73)	*0,41 (0,09)*	0,20 (0,36)
Lrytas (other=0; yes=1)	0,12 (0,59)	-0,03 (0,94)	0,09 (0,80)	0,25 (0,42)
Alfa.lt (other=0; yes=1)	-0,24 (0,45)	-0,76 (0,13)	-0,39 (0,42)	*-0,75 (0,09)*
Russian TV Channels (other=0; yes=1)	*-0,20 (0,06)*	*-0,44 (0,01)*	-0,09 (0,56)	-0,12 (0,38)

Confidence level =95%, statistically significant scores are highlighted in bold and italic, N=1004

3.1. General assessment of military threats

The authors researched the impact of mass-media sources (independent variables) on the perception of threat probabilities using models of structural equations, jointly including indicators of political competences (political education, interpersonal communication on political topics, participation in the activities of non-governmental organizations, voting in elections, political self-identification on the left-right scale), socio-demographic factors (age, gender, ethnicity, education and employment status as well as the subjective assessments of income received and place of residence).

The assessment of the general danger of non-differentiated military threats, in terms of statistics, is closely associated with the use of the information channel. The habits of use in the news television, radio, the press, the Internet or social networks make no direct influence on the overall perception of military threats. Watching Russian TV (an aggregated indicator showing that the respondent watches at least one Russian TV channel) is the most significant factor decreasing the assessment of military threats. Figuratively speaking, the impact of Russian TV on attitudes toward the danger of military threats can be treated as a certain 'sedative medicine'. However, the use of Russian TV channels is directly linked to political education, the manner of political communication and political activity (intention to vote in elections); thus, the users of these media channels cannot be treated as citizens who are passive or easy to manipulate and convince. It has been noted that watching Russian TV is directly associated with the importance of political communication acknowledged by the individual, the political education of the individual and the determination to vote. Lithuanian inhabitants who share rightist political attitudes watch Russian TV less frequently. Thus, the tendency noted here rather obviously illustrates the phenomenon of selective exposure to information.

Ideological orientation on the left-right scale and other variables of political competence distinguished in the research also influence the generalized perception of military threats. Ideological self-identification, activeness of political communication and the determination to vote in elections are directly associated with the perception of military threats. The danger of military threats was more frequently emphasized by respondents who are far right, politically more active (voting in elections) and more often informally communicating on political topics.


Figure 2. **Perceptions of the Probability of Military Threats: Impact of Media Channels, Political Values and Competences**

3.2. Assessment of the probability of a Russian invasion

The probability of a Russian military invasion of Lithuania is a topical and targeted military threat (clear source of threat). In the structural equation model, the users of Russian TV and the tabloid press consider this threat as hardly probable. Information portals on the Internet also have a direct influence on the assessment of the probability of Russian military invasion; however, this influence (strengthening) in comparison to the impact of Russian TV and the tabloid press is weaker. The political education of the active users of social networks is relatively higher but they less frequently communicate on politi-

cal topics (i.e., the level of informal political communication of the users of social networks is lower) in everyday life (not just virtually). Thus, the noted tendency here contradicts the thesis stating that the use of social networks functions as a two-step flow of communication, i.e., encourages and supports interpersonal communication on the grounds of information obtained via social networks.

Political views and an interest in politics are also directly associated with assessments of the probability of a Russian military invasion. Extreme right respondents and those submitting a higher assessment of the importance of politics tend to give more points to the assessment of the threat of invasion.


Figure 3. **Perceptions of Probability of Russian Military Intervention: The Impact of Media Channels, Political Values and Competences**

3.3. Assessments of the probability of NATO disintegration

The possibility of NATO disintegration (topical, diffused threat) in analysed public opinion polls is assessed as a hardly realistic scenario.[52] Respondents of a greater political competence (more politically educated, participa-

[52] The results of opinion polls on this issue are substantially different from the ones presented in media. Media content monitoring which served as a base for the public opinion questionnaire construction indicated that the issue of NATO unity and stability is very salient in the Lithuanian media discourse.

ting in civil and political life, more actively discussing political topics) assess the probability of NATO disintegration by giving far fewer points. The threat of NATO disintegration in a reverse way is associated with watching news on TV or listening to it on the radio or reading the tabloid press. Watching Russian TV is associated with lower assessments of threats, but the connection is not statistically significant.


Confidence level =95%, N= 891.

Figure 4. **Perceptions of Probability of NATO Disintegration: The Impact of Media Channels, Political Values and Competences**

3.4. Assessments of the probability of decreasing national security

The decreasing level of national security probability (ambiguous, diffused threat) is associated with watching Russian TV and reading the tabloid press (the reverse connection). The impact of both of these news media channels on assessments of this ambiguous threat probability is similar. The political activeness of the individual (determination to vote) is the main factor enhancing the anxiety concerning declining national security. In turn, the determination to vote depends on the political education level of the individual.

Figure 5. **Perceptions of Decreasing National Security Probability: The Impact of Media Channels, Political Values and Competences**

While summing up differences between socio-demographic groups and the impact of mass-media channel use as well as political competences on the perception of military threats, the authors noted a certain balance mechanism. One of the most influential sources shaping the perception of threats – Russian TV – is mostly watched in towns where there are more 'compensating' factors, such as university education and a larger income. In rural areas, Russian TV channels are watched 50 percent less frequently than in the towns, and these news media means are more popular among senior (over 50 years of age) inhabitants. Does this mean that the impact of Russian TV on the perception of military threats in Lithuania is mostly limited by ethnic identity? An analysis of TV audiences according to ethnicity demonstrates that Russian TV is also rather popular with Polish respondents – 49% (by comparison, 21% Lithuanians and 70% Russians watch Russian TV). The most important factor distinguishing the Russian TV audience in Lithuania is socio-economic – 31% of those who experience income hardships currently watch Russian TV. Reading tabloid dailies lags twofold behind the Russian audience (12% against 24%) and in contrast with Russian TV this has no ethnicity limitation and is popular in rural areas.

Figure 6. **Accessibility of Media Channels (N=1004)**

General Conclusions

The results of the research indicate that the use of a specific mass-media channel has a substantial impact on public opinion. It should be stated that this impact is greater in the case of questions that most respondents have no direct experience of. The use of different mass-media channels exerts a direct influence on the attitudes of the audience and analysis of the content disseminated by media is not necessary in order to recognize the tendencies of the impact of the mass media on the perception of military threats.

Most of research's outcomes confirm the tendencies detected in previous research. There are particularly many link-ups with the cultivation thesis; we find that the impact of mass-media sources on the assessment of military threats is associated with an individual's social environment, his/her political competences and experiences and standpoints of civil and political participation. In our research, the cultivation effect is particularly felt via Russian TV and the tabloid press, which, as it turns out, operate not only as information carriers but also as indicators of certain political and civil experiences and choices esta-

blishing particular attitudes to military threats concerning Lithuania's security and welfare. The research also reveals a certain differentiation of mediating factors in the assessments of specific military topical threats (targeted versus diffused) and aggregated military threats. The combination of factors shaping the assessments of targeted threats is more compact and trajectories of the impact of separate factors are expressed more distinctly. The method of structural equation analysis reveals a manifold conditionality of the assessment of military threats, including the individual's political competence, political views, social status, etc., which are not brought together to a narrowly and categorically defined ethnic origin and the inclination to watch Russian TV or read the tabloid press. More attention should be devoted to this insight in future research and it should be taken into consideration in shaping and implementing measures of the national security strategy.

It is important to emphasize that – differently from the scanty material on the insights of new social network research – in Lithuania the impact of Internet information portals is not directional and there is no clear tendency that active users of social networks would assess political matters (here, military threats) in some exceptional way. This indicates the weakness of the 'second' step (direct interpersonal communication) in the communication chain. This phenomenon is associated with both the relatively weak civil society and with the particularly intensive and tight 'bubbles' of social media as well as with the scarcity of open discussions and considerations initiated by politicians and public policy measures that are little developed and do not involve varied social groups (crossing ethnic boundaries and socio-economic differences). These observations, particularly in the light of hybrid warfare and the context of hostile Russian policy towards the statehood of Lithuania that is not declining, encourage researchers to carry out in-depth research in the area of the interface between the use of modern social media and perceiving military threats since this particular research can generate not only expert knowledge but also create certain social practices directly contributing to the 'second' stage of information flow (direct communication on political topics) and the strengthening of society's resilience (via providing professional and comprehensive information as well as increasing interpersonal and institutional confidence).

June 2018

Annex no. 1 Descriptive statistics. General distribution (mean scores) across the population groups

Table3. **Perceptions of threats' probabilities. Descriptive statistics.**
(Question: What is the probability that the listed threats will occur
in Lithuania during the next 10 years period?)

		Probability of Military Threats During the next 10 Years (average scores 1 – 5)	Probability of Russian Military Intervention (average 0-7)	Probability of Disintegration of NATO Alliance (average scores 0-7)	Probability of Decreasing level of National security (average scores 0-7)
Gender	Male	3	3,3	3	3,7
	Female	3,1	3,5	2,9	3,9
Age groups	<50 years	3,1	3,5	3	3,7
	>50 years	3	3,4	2,9	3,9
Place of residence	Rural regions	3,2	4	3	4
	Other cities	2,9	3	3,2	3,6
	Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai, Panevėžys	3,1	3,5	2,7	3,9
	Vilnius	3	3,1	2,9	3,6
Self-assessment on household's financial status	With current income we are coping quite prosperously	2,9	3,3	3	3,9
	We can easily coping with current income	3	3,2	2,7	3,6
	We have some difficulties coping with the current income	3,2	3,6	3,1	3,9
	We are very hardly coping with current income	3,1	3,5	3,4	4
Education	University / unfinished university education	3	3,4	2,8	3,8
	Higher school / secondary education	3	3,4	3	3,8
	Unfinished secondary education	3,1	3,9	3,4	3,9

		Probability of Military Threats During the next 10 Years (average scores 1 – 5)	Probability of Russian Military Intervention (average 0-7)	Probability of Disintegration of NATO Alliance (average scores 0-7)	Probability of Decreasing level of National security (average scores 0-7)
Nationality	Lithuanian	3,1	3,6	3	3,8
	Russian	2	1,8	2,5	3,1
	Polish	2,4	2,5	2,9	3,4
How often do you participate in religious activities?	At least once a week	3,3	4	3,1	4,2
	At least once a month	3,1	3,6	3,1	3,9
	Only during major religious events or on special occasions	3	3,4	2,9	3,9
	Less often	2,9	3,2	2,9	3,4
	Never	2,9	3,3	3,2	3,7
Sector of employment	Public sector	3	3,4	3	3,9
	Private sector and NGO's	3	3,2	2,8	3,6
How often do you follow the news on the radio or TV?	Daily	3	3,4	2,8	3,8
	3 – 4 days per week	3,1	3,6	3,4	3,9
	1 – 2 days per week	3	3,4	3,1	3,8
	Once a week or less often	3	3,6	3,3	4
	Never	3,4	3,8	3,7	3,9
How often do you read print-press?	Daily	3,1	3,6	2,7	3,9
	3 – 4 days per week	3,1	3,5	3	4,1
	1 – 2 days per week	3	3,4	2,8	3,6
	Once a week or less often	3,1	3,3	2,9	3,6
	Never	3	3,4	3,2	3,8
How often do you read internet info-portals?	Daily	3	3,4	2,8	3,7
	3 – 4 days per week	3,1	3,4	2,7	3,7
	1 – 2 days per week	2,9	3,2	3,1	3,6
	Once a week or less often	3,2	3,4	3,1	3,9
	Never	3,1	3,5	3,1	3,9

		Probability of Military Threats During the next 10 Years (average scores 1 – 5)	Probability of Russian Military Intervention (average 0-7)	Probability of Disintegration of NATO Alliance (average scores 0-7)	Probability of Decreasing level of National security (average scores 0-7)
How often do you follow news on internet social networks? (Facebook, Twitter or other)	Daily	3,1	3,7	3	3,8
	3 – 4 days per week	3,1	3,3	2,9	3,7
	1 – 2 days per week	3	3,3	2,8	3,8
	Once a week or less often	3,2	3,6	2,9	3,6
	Never	3	3,3	3	3,8
How much time daily do you spend for acquiring global and local political news? News in printed press	No time at all	3	3,5	3,2	3,8
	Up to 1 hour per day	3	3,3	2,8	3,8
	Several hours per day	3,3	3,9	3,1	4,2
How much time daily do you spend for acquiring global and local political news? News on TV	No time at all	3	3,4	3,1	3,6
	Up to 1 hour per day	3	3,4	2,9	3,8
	Several hours per day	3,1	3,4	3	3,9
Are you a member of any civil organization or are you involved in any voluntary activity?	No	3	3,4	3	3,8
	Yes	3,2	3,7	2,7	3,9
Would you vote if there would be parliamentary elections tomorrow?	No, I'd abstain from voting	2,9	3,4	3,2	3,5
	Yes, I'd participate in voting	3,1	3,4	2,9	3,9
How important is politics for you personally?	Not important at all	3	3,3	3,1	3,7
	Not very important	3	3,3	3	3,8
	Quite important	3,2	3,6	2,8	4
	Very important	3,1	3,6	2,6	3,5
How often do you discuss political issues with your relatives or friends?	Never	3	3,4	3,2	3,8
	Occasionally	3	3,3	2,9	3,7
	Often	3,2	3,8	2,6	4,1

		Probability of Military Threats During the next 10 Years (average scores 1 – 5)	Probability of Russian Military Intervention (average 0-7)	Probability of Disintegration of NATO Alliance (average scores 0-7)	Probability of Decreasing level of National security (average scores 0-7)
Political Education (index 0-5)	0	3,1	3,9	3,4	3,7
	1	3,2	3,8	3,4	4
	2	3,1	3,5	3	3,7
	3	2,9	3,2	3	3,8
	4	3	3,2	2,7	3,8
	5	3,2	3,5	2,6	3,8

Annex no. 2 Original wording in the questionnaire

Indicators of military threats:

What threats would be the most dangerous for our society during the next 10 years period? Please estimate the probability on 5-point scale where 1 means very little danger and 5 means very big danger.

	Little danger		Big danger
Military	1-----2-----3-----4-----5		

What is a probability that these events would occur in Lithuania in the next 10 years period? Please estimate the probability on 7-point scale where 1 means very little probability and 7 means very big probability.

	What is a probability that these events would occur in Lithuania in the next 10 years period?			This is not a threat at all
	Very small probability		Very big probability	
Russian military invasion in Lithuania	1-2-3-4-5-6-7			9
Disintegration of NATO	1-2-3-4-5-6-7			9
Decreasing level of national security	1-2-3-4-5-6-7			9

Indicators of political education and competences:

How often do you discuss political issues with your relatives or friends?

1.	Often
2.	Occasionally
3.	Never
8.	Don't know
9.	No answer

How important is politics for you?

1. Non important at all
2. Not very important
3. Quite important
4. Very important

Are you a member of any civil organization or are you involved in any voluntary activity?

1. Yes
2. No

Indicators of political education index. We would like to ask some general questions about national and international politics.

1. Who is the speaker of the Lithuanian parliament?	Write in:
2. What is the duration of parliamentary term in Lithuania?	Write in:
3. Which political party representative leads the ministry of Economic Affairs?	Write in:
4. What is the name of Ukrainian president?	Write in:
5. Please name at least one country, which has a border with Syria?	Write in:

Would you vote if there would be parliamentary elections tomorrow?

1. Yes, I would participate in voting

2. No, I would abstain

Political beliefs and values:

In politics, we talk about the "left" and "right" political ideologies. How would you rate yourself on this ideological scale?

Leftist	1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9---10	Rightist

Media usage:

How often do you:

	Daily	3 – 4 days per week	1 – 2 days per week	Once a week or less often	Never
Watch news on TV / listen to the news on radio	1	2	3	4	5
Read newspapers or journals (printed press)	1	2	3	4	5
Read news on internet	1	2	3	4	5
Follow news on internet social networks (Facebook, Twitter or other)	1	2	3	4	5

How much time daily do you spend to acquire international and national news?

Single answer in every row	No time at all	Up to 1 hour per day	Several hours per day
News in printed press	1	2	3
News on TV	1	2	3
News on the radio	1	2	3
News on internet	1	2	3
News on social network (Facebook, Twitter)	1	2	3

What national newspapers or journals do you read (paper press)?

Please write-in the titles: _____99. None

What international newspapers or journals do you read (paper press)?

Please write-in the titles: _____99. None

What national TV channels do you watch?

Please write-in the titles: _____99. None

What international TV channels do you watch?

Please write-in the titles: _____99. None

What national radio stations do you listen to?

Please write-in the titles: _____99. None

What international radio stations do you listen to?

Please write-in the titles: _____99. None

What national internet sites do you follow (including news portals, blogs, etc.)?

Please write-in the titles: _____99. None

What national internet sites do you follow (including news portals, blogs, etc.)?

Please write-in the titles: _____ 99. None